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COMMENTS

privilege against self-incrimination, and an individual defendant, notwithstanding his constitutional rights against self incrimination which would
[otherwise] excuse him from producing personal records, could be compelled to produce those records which he is required by law to keep. '"67
Once again the opportunity to examine such returns has passed another
hurdle.
CONCLUSION

Thus it is apparent that individual federal income tax returns are available to a moving party in civil actions, at least in the majority of the federal courts if they can be shown to be germane to the issues at hand, or
to be likely to lead to other pertinent information, by use of the deposition-discovery rules.
Even the stumbling blocks of inadmissibility in evidence, 8 and the defense of self-incrimination do not preclude their availability to the attorney who makes intelligent use of these rules.
Clearly, the words "privilege" and "confidential" have lost much of
their force with reference to these returns. Individual federal income tax
returns can no longer be considered personal to the maker and the Revenue Department. The answer to the question "Are your income tax returns
your own?" is most probably "No."
67 United States v. Jones, 72 F. Supp. 48, 50 (D.C. Miss., 1947); Bowles v. Amato,
60 F. Supp. 361 (D.C. Colo., 1945).
68 Republic of Italy v. De Angelis, 14 F.R.D. 519, 520 (S.D. N.Y., 1953): "Under rules
relative to inspection of documents it is not necessary to establish the admissibility of
the documents, but it is sufficient if the documents concern matters generally bearing
on the issue and there is a reasonable probability that the documents contain material
evidence."

ADMISSIBILITY OF INVOLUNTARY CONFESSIONS
CONFIRMED BY SUBSEQUENT FACTS
Confessions, generally, must be voluntary before they are admissible in
evidence. Thus statements of an accused person that are induced by threats
or promises of benefit are inadmissible as evidence, because such statements are likely to be influenced by these inducements.
It sometimes happens that, by means of an involuntary confession, facts
are discovered which are relevant to a case. Evidence of such facts is universally admissible.' The question then arises whether the confession or
some part of it should also be admitted if it is verified by evidence discovered subsequently.
Before discussing what part, if any, of the confession should be ad1 Wigmore, Evidence § 859 (3rd ed., 1940) (supp., 1955); Wharton, Criminal Evidence S600 (11th ed., 1935).
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mitted, the problem confronting the prosecution should be noted. For example, when the subsequently discovered fact is given in evidence alone,
it is found to be quite insufficient in itself unless it can be linked with the
accused.2 Hence, the confession, or part of it, is sought to be introduced
into evidence to show that the fact was discovered as a result of a statement of the accused, implying that the accused must have known of that
fact.
The three views presented by the courts as to the extent that confessions
leading to such discovery may be received into evidence are: 3 (I) admit
the entire confession to accompany the facts; (II) admit only the part of
the confession that relates to the corroborating facts; and (III) admit no
part of the confession but only the facts discovered thereby.
I. Admit the entire confession to accompany the facts.-Mr. Wigmore
appeared to favor this rule. He stated: "If we are to cease distrusting any
part [of the confession], we should cease distrusting all. ''4 He argued that

subsequent facts and the whole confession that led to their discovery are
admissible, claiming that this is the most logical and desirable view to take.
The assumption is that improperly induced confessions are excluded solely because they are not entitled to credit. When they are confirmed or
verified in part, the whole confession should be admitted in evidence since
"it can hardly be supposed that at certain parts the possible fiction stopped
and the truth began, and that by a marvellous coincidence the truthful
parts are exactly those which a subsequent search (more or less controlled
by chance) happened to confirm." This theory raises the question, why
should it be assumed that a confession confirmed in part is true in its
totality? It is certainly not difficult to imagine cases where a person, acting
under an inducement, makes a confession that is a combination of true
and false statements.
This rule is embodied in Texas law, where the admissibility of confes2 The accused points out or tells where stolen property is: Banks v. State, 84 Ala. 430,
4 So. 382 (1888); Berry v. United States, 2 Colo. 186 (1873); State v. Willis, 71 Conn.
293, 41 Ad. 820 (1898); People v. Ascey, 304 111.404, 136 N.E. 766 (1922); Garrard v.
State, 50 Miss. 147 (1874); State v. Winston, 116 N.C. 990, 21 S.E. 37 (1895); or in case
of homicide, the accused states where the body can be found: Hall v. State, 247 Ala.
263, 24 So. 2d 20 (1946); or tells what weapon was used: Whitfield v. State, 236 Ala.
312, 182 So. 42 (1938); Gipson v. State, 162 Miss. 480, 139 So. 868 (1932).
3 In State v. Cocklin, 109 Vt. 207, 194 Atl. 378, 380 (1937) the court sets out the three
rules and cites cases supporting each one. The court goes on to say: "Since the reason
for excluding involuntary confessions, as we have seen, is the likelihood of their being
fabricated in the hope of escaping punishment, or obtaining leniency, the second rule
seems the more logical." Dupuis v. State, 14 Ohio App. 67 (1918); Harris v. Commonwealth, 301 Ky. 818, 193 S.W. 2d 466 (1946); Daniel v. State, 212 Miss. 223, 54 So. 2d
272 (1951).

Wigmore, Evidence S 857 (3rd ed., 1940) (supp., 1955).
5 Ibid.
4
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sions is largely governed by statute.6 The Texas courts are very emphatic
in their decisions; for example, in Rhodes v. State it was said:
If the accused makes statements relative to the crime charged found to be
true, and which conduce to establish his guilt, they are admissible regardless of
whether he7 be under arrest, unwarned, or induced to make them by promises
or threats.
However, the rule does not apply where the facts so disclosed were known
prior to and independently of the confession.$
This view has also been followed by the courts of Arkansas,9 Delaware'0
and Kentucky" though it is not clear how far they will go in a given case.

II. Admit only that part of the confession that relates to the corroborating facts.-This is the English rule, 12 and the rule followed in many
states. In Banks v. State the court stated it clearly and concisely:
. . Though a confession may be obtained by the influence of threats or
promises, if they disclosed extraneous facts, which show their truth and tend
to prove the commission of the crime, so much of the confession as relates
strictly to the facts discovered, and such facts, are admissible in evidence, but
not the entire confession.' 8
The rule has been accepted upon the authority of Mr. Leach, who a
century and a half ago said:
The reason of rejecting extorted confessions is the apprehension that the
prisoner may have been thereby induced to say what is false; but the fact discovered
shows that so much of the confession as immediately relates to it is
14
true.

The courts have selected this rule in preference to the first or third rule
because they feel there is no logical reason for accepting the entire confes6 Texas Code Cr. Proc., Art. 727 (1925).
797 Tex. Cr. 602, 262 S.W. 753, 754 (1924). In Torres v. State, 145 Tex. Cr. 365, 168
S.W. 2d 265 (1943), the court said the entire statement was admissible notwithstanding
those portions of the statement that were in no way affected by finding the weapon
with which the crime was committed. Stelman v. State, 123 Tex. Cr. 330, 58 S.W. 2d
831 (1933); Campbell v. State, 103 Tex. Cr. 488, 280 S.W. 1068 (1926); Wells v. State,
4 Tex. App. 20 (1878).
8 22 C.J.S., Criminal Law S 831 (1940) (supp., 1956); Rains v. State, 94 Tex. Cr. 576,
252 S.W. 58 (1923); Baggett v. State, 65 Tex. Cr. 425, 144 S.W. 1136 (1912).
9 Shufflin v. State, 122 Ark. 606, 184 S.W. 454 (1916).
10 State v. Brick, 2 Harr. 530 (1835).
11 Boughman v. Commonwealth, 206 Ky. 441, 267 S.W. 231 (1924).
12 Stephens, Digest of the Law of Evidence, Art. 23 (12th Rev., 1948); Phipson, Evidence 273 (9th ed., 1952); Cockle, Cases and Statutes on Evidence 197 (8th ed., 1952).
18 Banks v. State, 84 Ala. 430, 431, 4 So. 382, 383 (1888). Other decisions in accord:
Minton v. State, 20 Ala. App. 176, 101 So. 169 (1924); Whitehead v. State, 16 Ala. App.
427, 78 So. 467 (1918); People v. Ascey, 304 111. 404, 136 N.E. 766 (1922); State v. Cocklin, 109 Vt. 207, 194 Atd. 378 (1937).
14 Leach's note, I Leach Crown Cases, 265 (4th ed., 1815).
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sion as being true when it is not totally confirmed by subsequent facts.
Nor, is there any reason to exclude the entire confession where portions
of it have been substantiated by the subsequently discovered facts. This
reasoning is based solely on whether or not a confession is trustworthy.
III. Admit no part of the confession but only the facts discovered
thereby.-This is the prevailing doctrine in this country.' 5 Thus a witness
is allowed to testify that the stolen property was found in a certain place,
but he cannot say it was discovered as a result of a confession made by the
prisoner. Yet, we realize that if the property is found in an empty lot, it
may be of no value to the prosecution unless it can prove that the prisoner
knew it was there.
It is clear from the previous analysis that there has been no uniformity
in judicial treatment of the admissibility of an involuntary confession in
part or in toto by the subsequently discovered facts. Aside from the basic
rule that such confessions are inadmissible because they are not entitled
to credit, the courts felt that only by treating them as such can the police
be discouraged from extracting them.' 0
The moving though unarticulated, reason (for excluding confessions improperly induced) is that prosecuting authorities are prone to rely too heavily
upon confessions and to neglect the thorough investigation which they would
17
otherwise make and which their duty demands ....
In other words, the laws of evidence can be used as a method for improving police practices and protecting rights of individuals. This is necessary
because the civil remedies that a prisoner has against the police may be
quite ineffective, either to deter them, or to compensate him for harm he
may suffer. Further, the likelihood of criminal prosecution being brought
against the police is very slight.
If the courts accepted the first view, the law enforcement agencies
would have unlimited power to commit illegal acts in order to extort a
confession. "The multiplication of crimes as a remedy for crime would be
15 Jones v. State, 5 Ga. 835 (1885); State v. Height, 117 Iowa 650, 91 N.W. 935 (1902);
State v. Dooley, 89 Iowa 584, 57 N.W. 414 (1894); State v. Mortimer, 20 Kan. 93 (1878);
Commonwealth v. Phillips, 26 Ky. L. Rep. 543, 82 S.W. 286 (1904); Whitney v. Commonwealth, 24 Ky. L. Rep. 2524, 74 S.W. 257 (1903); Taylor v. Commonwealth, 19

Ky. L. Rep. 836, 42 S.W. 1125 (1897); Rector v. Commonwealth, 80 Ky. 468 (1882);
Commonwealth v. James, 99 Mass. 438 (1868); Brister v. State, 211 Miss. 365, 51 So. 2d
759 (1951); Smith v. State, 166 Miss. 893, 144 So. 471 (1932); Whitley v. State, 78 Miss.
255, 28 So. 852 (1900); Garrard v. State, 50 Miss. 147 (1874); State v. Ruck, 194 Mo. 416,
92 S.W. 706 (1906); State v. Winston, 116 N.C. 990, 21 S.E. 37 (1895); State v. Knapp,
70 Ohio St. 380, 71 N.E. 705 (1904); Commonwealth v. Johnson, 213 Pa. 432, 62 At.
1064 (1906); State v. Middleton, 69 S.C. 72, 48 S.E. 35 (1904).

10 The Third Degree-Its Historical Background, the Present Law and Recommendations, 43 Ky. L. J. 392 (1955).
17Model Code of Evidence, Rule 505, Comment c (1942).
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a very absurd and disastrous public policy... ."18 The second view would
be acceptable if the only question propounded was whether or not the
confession was trustworthy. Hence, the best way to secure fair treatment
for the accused and to deter the zeal of the police in extorting confessions,
is to deny to the latter the fruits of their illegal acts. The court in Wilson
v. State declared:
While the character of the confession is ordinarily shown by answers to appropriate questions, the court should look beyond these to the condition, situation, and character of the accused and the circumstances surrounding him. 19

Therefore, it would seem the third view is the most just.
On the other hand, it may be doubted that the rules of evidence ought
be used as a potential threat to the police to force them to go about their
job properly. One may share the conviction of Wigmore, that the fewer
obstacles there are in the way of admitting the confession, the greater is
the justice attained in the end.
CONCLUSION

In the last analysis, whether or not involuntary confessions, which the
police illegally obtain, ought to be admitted depends upon the community
involved. A very important factor is the respect for the law that is found
in the law-enforcement agencies of the community, and the relating rarity
of their deliberate departure from ordinary standards of justice. The existence of a large criminal class and a high crime rate also may be other
important factors in determining the social need of the community that
should determine its laws.
It is doubtful if any part of the confession ought to be admissible, even
though confirmed by the discovery of evidence made in consequence of
the confession because the reasons for excluding improper confessions are
complex and not based solely on a presumed untrustworthiness.
18

Rusher v. State, 94 Ga. 363, 21 S.E. 593, 594 (1894).

19 84

Ala. 426, 428; 4 So. 383, 384 (1888).

FEDERAL JURISDICTION UNDER THE COMMERCE
CLAUSE AND INTRASTATE EXTORTION
What is the status of the law as to federal jurisdiction over cases wherein an intrastate telephone message was used for the purpose of extortion
or the perpetration of fraud? The bases upon which federal jurisdiction
is sought are the extortion by interstate communications' and the fraud
by wire2 sections of the Federal Criminal Code.
The abovementioned code provisions will be referred to as the extor1 18 U.S.C.A. 875.

2. 18

U.S.C.A. 1343.

